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Abstract
Ability of managers and other nonproduction professionals is key for the productivity of firms.
Hence, the assignment of heterogeneous nonproduction workers across firms determines the distri-
bution of productivity. In turn, the transmission of productivity differences into profit differences –
resulting from product market competition – determines firms’ willingness to pay for higher man-
agerial skills. This paper explores the equilibrium assignment of nonproduction workers across ex
ante identical firms which results from this interaction between product market and the market for
nonproduction skills. The analysis suggests that, typically, large and productive firms coexist with
small, low-productivity firms. Consistent with empirical evidence, a skewed distribution of firm
size tends to arise. Moreover, the model predicts a positive relationship of firm size to productiv-
ity, manager quality, and manager remuneration. Finally, according to comparative-static analysis,
higher intensity of product market competition can account for increases in the compensation at
the top of the wage distribution.
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1 Introduction
Managers and other nonproduction professionals in firms organize produc-
tion, develop firm-specific know-how and design products, thereby determin-
ing a firm’s productivity. Not surprisingly, empirical evidence from longi-
tudinal microdata suggests that diﬀerences in both productivity and size of
firms are driven by diﬀerences in manager quality (see e.g. the survey by
Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Moreover, there is a strong complementarity
between skills and profitable innovations within firms (see Leiponen, 2005,
and the references therein). This raises the question why large and produc-
tive firms with highly-qualified nonproduction workers coexist with small,
low-productivity firms.
This paper argues that such an asymmetric outcome naturally arises from
the following interaction between competition of firms in monopolistic prod-
uct markets and the market for heterogeneous nonproduction workers. On
the one hand, assignment of nonproduction workers across firms determines
the distribution of firms’ productivity. On the other hand, the transmission
of productivity diﬀerences into profit diﬀerences — resulting from product
market competition — determines firms’ willingness to pay for higher nonpro-
duction skills.
It is shown that the equilibrium assignment of nonproduction skills, which
results from this interaction, tends to be asymmetric when diﬀerences among
firms in productivity become increasingly magnified in profit diﬀerences.
That is, when gross profits of a firm are strictly convex as a function of
its productivity, in equilibrium typically large and productive firms coexist
with small, low-productivity firms — despite symmetry of potential entrants
ex ante. Employing a specification where the price elasticity of product
demand is constant (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), this property tends to arise
when the price elasticity is suﬃciently high and in line with observed price
mark-ups.
In standard imperfect competition models, in which the number of active
firms is determined by some exogenous entry cost, symmetry of potential en-
trants typically leads to symmetric free-entry equilibria.1 A recent exception
is Yano (2006) who proposes a game-theoretic price competition model in
which (a small number of) firms choosing a large-scale technology coexists
1For instance, see “love of variety” models of monopolistic competition (Spence, 1976;
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), “ideal variety” models (Lancaster, 1979; Helpman, 1981) or
“location” (spatial) models (Hotelling, 1929; Salop, 1979).
1
Grossmann: Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages
with (a large number of) firms choosing a small-scale technology. In contrast,
in the present paper asymmetry arises from firms’ hiring of nonproduction
workers in general equilibrium rather than from technology choice.
The question why high-ability workers cluster in some firms and low-
ability workers in others, and the implications for the distribution of firm
size and the wage structure, have gained considerable attention (e.g., Kre-
mer 1993; Kremer and Maskin, 1996; Grossman and Maggi, 2000; Saint-Paul,
2001; Prat, 2002).2 The previous job assignment literature, by focussing on
models with perfect product markets, suggests that asymmetric sorting of
workers in firms is driven by technological complementarity and intrafirm
spillovers among workers. In contrast, this paper argues that firm hetero-
geneity arises from the incentive of firms to enter product market competition
with high productivity. Intrafirm spillovers in the development of intrinsic
firm characteristics are shown to contribute to the emergence of an asym-
metric equilibrium, but are not necessary for its emergence.3
The paper aims to address a number of stylized facts related to the (asym-
metric) assignment of key workers. Results are consistent with a positive
relationship of firm size to productivity, manager quality, and wages of non-
production workers. Also in line with empirical evidence, the sorting of non-
production skills into firms tends to generate a skewed distribution of firm
size (where size is measured by total employment in a firm). Moreover, al-
lowing for multiple market locations, it is shown that high-productivity firms
enter more market locations than low-productivity firms, i.e., have more es-
tablishments. Finally, the analysis attempts to shed light on the dramatic
shifts in the distribution of income in the U.S. and elsewhere. Evidence by
Piketty and Saez (2003, 2007) suggests that particularly the share of wage
income accrued to the upper decile of the wage distribution has increased.
The proposed framework is particularly designed to address top wage in-
come shares, due to its focus on high-skilled nonproduction workers. The
2For a comprehensive review of the less recent literature on job assignment, see Sat-
tinger (1993). Skewed wage distributions are usually derived from a magnification of skill
diﬀerences into increasingly larger earning diﬀerentials. In seminal work on this idea,
Rosen (1981) derives a strictly convex mapping from individual ability to individual earn-
ings from the ability of more talented individuals (acting as atomistic firms) to cover a
wider range of markets. In Rosen (1982), a similar magnification eﬀect arises with respect
to manager remuneration due to a complementarity between supervisory skills and the
span of control.
3In contrast to the literature, such spillovers may occur among nonproduction rather
than production workers.
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analysis suggests that higher intensity of product market competition leads
to increases in the compensation at the top of the wage distribution.
Rather than stressing product market forces, Murphy and Zabojnik (2004)
argue that technologically-driven increases in the demand for managerial
skills which are transferable across firms and industries, relative to the de-
mand for firm-specific skills, can account for the surge in top manager wages.
Grossman and Maggi (2000) explore a perfect competition model in which, in
line with the previous job assignment literature, workers with similar ability
are matched together in firms if there is technological skill complementar-
ity, whereas substitutability leads to cross-matching of workers. They show
that in economies in which skills are relatively diversely distributed (like the
U.S.) trade liberalization leads to wage increases for low-skilled individuals,
whereas the eﬀects on wages for the highest-skilled individuals are ambigu-
ous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model which
is characterized by a specific product demand structure and technology. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the equilibrium assignment of nonproduction skills and dis-
cusses the wage structure. It also examines whether the equilibrium job
assignment is welfare-maximizing. Section 4 derives comparative-static re-
sults. Section 5 generalizes the basic model. Section 6 discusses the empirical
relevance of the results. The last section briefly concludes.
2 The Basic Model
There is a continuum of identical market locations, indexed by m, which are
represented as points in the unit interval. In each location m, there is a
representative consumer whose preferences are reflected by utility function
Um =
⎛
⎝
NmZ
0
(xi,m)
σ−1
σ di
⎞
⎠
σ
σ−1
, (1)
σ > 1, where xi,m is the quantity of good i ∈ [0, Nm] in market m. Measure
Nm is called the number of products in m.
There is a large number of identical potential entrants in the economy
and entry is free. Opening up a firm may require to incur conventional fixed
costs F ≥ 0. Let I = [0, I] be the set of firms which actually enter. There
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are no flows of consumption goods across market locations, i.e., firms have
to produce in each location the output they want to sell. In order to open
an establishment in a single location, firms have to incur set up costs. These
depend on the measure of market locations in which a firm decides to operate,
called market range. Formally, let Mi ⊆ [0, 1] be the set of market locations
in which firm i ∈ I is active and let qi be the measure of Mi.4 Firm i’s
set up costs associated with a market range qi are given by Q(qi), where
Q(0) = 0 and Q(·) is both an increasing and convex function. Q and F
may be interpreted as capital costs which are sunk when firms enter product
market competition.
The analysis is confined to single-product firms. If firm i has an estab-
lishment in m, it produces according production function
xi,m = αili,m, (2)
where li,m denotes i’s labor input in m. Productivity αi is the same for a
firm i in all markets m ∈Mi.
There is a unit mass of individuals, endowed with one unit of labor, which
they inelastically supply to a perfect labor market. Individuals are immobile
across market locations. They diﬀer in skill level h, like managerial quality
or technical ability, relevant for the productivity of a firm. With respect to
other tasks, labor is homogenous (as in Lucas, 1978, among others). Let
g(h) be the mass function of the distribution of h, with support being the
set H = {h1, h2, ..., hK}, 0 ≤ h1 < h2 < ... < hK < ∞. Firms can perfectly
observe h and workers seek the highest wage.
Firms hire an exogenous mass s > 0 nonproduction workers, called man-
agers. The average skill level of these workers, h¯i, determines productivity of
a firm in each market location.5 This reflects the idea that managers develop
common assets of a firm, which are applicable for all of its establishments.6
4More precisely,Mi ∈M, whereM is a σ-algebra of Borel sets such that every element
is in the unit interval and qi is a Lebesgue measure.
5Taking the number of assigned workers in a firms as exogenous is a standard assump-
tion in the job assignment literature (e.g., Kremer 1993; Kremer and Maskin, 1996; Gross-
man and Maggi, 2000; Saint-Paul, 2001; Prat, 2002). Certainly constituting a limitation,
it contributes to the tractability of the analysis.
6In fact, empirical evidence suggests that productivity in single plants of a firm is
positively related to the average productivity of all other plants of this firm (Baily et al.,
1992).
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Formally, suppose
αi = a(h¯i), (3)
where a(·) is a strictly increasing function.
Firms are profit-maximizers and are engaged in monopolistic competition
in each market location they are active. Production labor is chosen as nu-
meraire good, i.e., the wage rate for production labor W = 1. As shown in
Appendix A, with utility function (1) and production function (2), profits of
firm i in m are given by
πi,m =
li,m
σ − 1 with li,m = (αi)
σ−1Lm
Ξm
, (4)
where Lm ≡
R Nm
0
lj,mdj is the aggregate amount of production labor employed
in market m and Ξm ≡
R Nm
0
(αi)σ−1di. As workers are immobile and of unit
mass, and since market locations are identical, in equilibrium, for all m,
Lm = L = 1− sI.
The timing of events evolves according to the following stages, with de-
cisions at each stage made simultaneously by firms.
• At stage 1, each firm i ∈ I hires managers with skills from the set H.
Wage costs for nonproduction workers are sunk at later stages.
• At stage 2, firms decide in which markets to be active, i.e., each firm
i ∈ I chooses a set Mi ⊆ [0, 1].
• At stage 3, firms enter monopolistic product market competition.
For instance, (productivity-enhancing) organizational or research activi-
ties in firms take place prior to product market competition. Treating associ-
ated wage costs for managers as sunk (stage 1) borrows from the IO literature
on investment games which treats R&D and marketing outlays as endoge-
nous sunk costs (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Sutton, 1998). The
model thus leads back endogenous sunk costs to individual characteristics,
accounting for individual heterogeneity and observing resource constraints.
The timing of events is also motivated by endogenous growth models in which
technical change is driven by in-house R&D (e.g., Young, 1998), undertaken
one period in advance of production and competition.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
For the equilibrium analysis of the basic model, we focus for simplicity on
the case of two types of workers, K = 2, and specify
a(h) = h, Q(qi) = κ (qi)
η , (5)
where κ > 0 and η > 1. Section 5 analyzes a generalized model which does
neither rely on these specifications nor on the specific stage 3 profit given by
(4).
That η > 1 (i.e., a strictly convex shape of Q(·)) may be justified by
logistic problems of firms to coordinate and govern single plants or branches,
which may outweigh potential scale economies (e.g. Coase, 1937; Porter,
1986; Williamson, 1975). That function a is linear ensures that results on
possibly asymmetric assignment of nonproduction workers to firms are not
driven by intrafirm spillovers. Such spillovers could be captured by assuming
that a is strictly convex. (See Remark 4 in section 5 for an elaboration and
discussion in light of related literature.)
In equilibrium, as all firms maximize profits, each firmmust have the same
stage 3 profit, πi,m, in all markets it is located.7 Otherwise, there would be
‘arbitrage’ possibilities. Hence, in addition to Lm = L = 1 − sI, we have
Ξm = Ξ, according to (4). This implies
πi,m =
(αi)σ−1
σ − 1
L
Ξ
≡ π(αi). (6)
Firms take aggregates L and Ξ as given at stage 2. We mostly focus on an
interior solution for optimal market range qi, which maximizes qiπ(αi)−Q(qi).
(Remarks 1-3 discuss if and how the main results are modified when there
are corner solutions.) Using (5), first-order condition π(αi) = Q0(qi) implies
qi = (π(αi)/κη)
1
η−1 ≡ q(αi). (7)
Thus, an important first result (generalized in section 5) is that firms with
higher productivity (αi) have higher market ranges. This is because profits
7Suppose to the contrary that πi,m > πi,m0 for m,m0 ∈ Mi. In this case, as market
locations are ex ante identical, there must be some firms which entered market m0 but not
m. However, this cannot hold in equilibrium when, as supposed, profits are higher in m
than in m0. Thus, in equilibrium, πi,m = πi,m0 for all m,m0 ∈Mi, i ∈ I.
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per market location, π, are rising with αi. As αi = a(h¯i), specification a(h) =
h implies αi = h¯i. Thus, stage 2 profits are given by f(h¯i) ≡ q(h¯i)π(h¯i) −
Q(q(h¯i)), called gross profits hereafter (as sunk costs for managers are not
included). Using Q(q) = κqη as well as (6) and (7), we obtain
f(h¯i) =
η − 1
κ
1
η−1
µ
L
(σ − 1)ηΞ
¶ η
η−1
(h¯i)
(σ−1)η
η−1 . (8)
3.1 Sorting in Equilibrium
We are now ready to derive the sorting of managerial skills into firms. For
this, it is useful to first characterize the wage schedule, by relying on intuitive
arguments. Rigorous proofs of the results in this subsection are provided for
the generalized model in section 5.
As there is free entry, gross profits of a firm with average skill level h¯i,
f(h¯i), must equal total wage costs for managers plus entry costs, F . That is,
net profits are zero and the average wage per manager is given by [f(h¯i) −
F ]/s. Firms take wages of managers, denoted by w(h) for skill type h ∈ H,
as given (perfect labor market). As shown in section 5 (Lemma 2), if both
skill types, h1, h2 are employed in the same firm, then the wage schedule is
w(h) =
f(h¯i)− F
s
+ f 0(h¯i)
h− h¯i
s
, h ∈ {h1, h2}. (9)
This can be seen intuitively. First, with this wage schedule, [f(h¯i) − F ]/s
is the average wage per manager, i.e., the requirement holds that net profits
equal zero. Second, the equilibrium wage diﬀerential w(h2)−w(h1) between
two types is proportional to the skill diﬀerential h2 − h1 whenever a firm
employs both types as managers. This must be the case because productivity
of a firm is determined by the average skill level of its managers.
If only one skill type h ∈ {h1, h2} is employed in a given firm, then
w(h) = [f(h) − F ]/s is implied by free entry (zero net profits). If no firm
hires more than one type of manager, the equilibrium job assignment is called
hypersegregated, as there is complete segregation of firms by managerial skill.
If all firms are identical in the skill mix they hire and thus their managers
have the same average skill, equilibrium job assignment is called symmetric.
It turns out that profit function (8) gives rise to a unique equilibrium with
either hypersegregation or symmetry.
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Proposition 1. (Sorting in basic model.) There exists a unique equilib-
rium in which job assignment is hypersegregated if σ > 2−1/η and symmetric
if σ < 2− 1/η.8
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 7 below (generalized
model).
According to Proposition 1, if σ > 2 − 1/η, an asymmetric equilibrium
with two types of firms necessarily arises, where firms diﬀer in productiv-
ity. The low-productivity firm hires only managers of skill h1 and the high-
productivity firm only managers of skill h2. This can be understood by the
intuitive properties of the wage schedule. Suppose to the contrary that there
is a firm which hires both skill types as managers. If σ > 2−1/η, gross profits
of firm i, f(h¯i), are strictly convex in the average skill level hired, according
to (8). In Fig. 1, wages w(h1) and w(h2) lie on the tangent (indicated by
the dotted line) of [f(h)− F ] /s at h = h¯i (point A), according to (9). Now
suppose firm i would raise its average skill level from h¯i to h¯0i by replacing
some managers of type h1 by some of type h2 > h1. In Fig. 1, this leads to
additional average wage cost per manager of CD and to additional gross prof-
its (net of F ) per manager of BD. As BD > CD, this means that, whenever
firm i employs both skill types as managers, a profitable deviation exists.
However, this contradicts the hypothesis that both types of skill are hired in
equilibrium, since in equilibrium a profitable deviation must not be possible.
Thus, if an equilibrium exists, it is unique and supports hypersegregation. It
is also easy to see that the equilibrium with hypersegregation indeed exists.
Under hypersegregation, zero profits command that wages w(h1) and w(h2)
are as depicted in Fig. 1. Given these wages, any deviation from hiring only
skill h1 or only skill h2 means that average wage costs per manager are on
the line between points E and F and therefore would exceed gross profits (net
of F ) per manager,
£
f(h¯i)− F
¤
/s, for any average skill level h¯i ∈ (h1, h2).
Consequently, if f(h) is strictly convex, a profitable deviation does not exist
for any firm under hypersegregation.9
Proposition 1 also provides an interesting insight for the emergence of
8We neglect the knife-edge case where σ = 2− 1/η.
9Conversely, if f(h) is strictly concave, i.e., σ < 2 − 1/η, then under a symmetric job
assignment no profitable deviation exists for a single firm. That all firms must have the
same average skill level in equilibrium follows from the fact (established in the proof of
Proposition 7) that the wage schedule in a more profitable firm cannot be less steep than
in a less profitable firm.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with hypersegregated job assignment.
segregation of firms by skill under monopolistic competition à la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). In this framework, σ is the constant price elasticity of de-
mand, as implied by utility function (1). If σ is high, then products are good
substitutes such that monopoly power of firms is low, all other things equal. If
σ is suﬃciently high, such that f(h) is strictly convex, then a given diﬀerence
in productivity among firms becomes increasingly magnified into diﬀerences
in gross profits. Consequently, all firms have an increasingly stronger incen-
tive to raise the average skill level of its managers. The transmission from
higher product market competition to labor market competition breaks the
ex ante symmetry among firms. As well known, the price mark-up (price
over marginal costs) with constant price elasticity σ of product demand is
9
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σ/(σ − 1). Empirical studies strongly suggest that the price mark-ups in
manufacturing industries and in the private economy as a whole are quite
small and clearly well below two (see e.g. Basu and Fernald, 1997, and the
references therein). In the basic model, this means σ > 2, which is suﬃcient
for hypersegregation, according to Proposition 1.
Remark 1. If there are strong scale economies in entering market lo-
cations, Q is not necessarily convex. If we relax the assumption that Q is
strictly convex, then we obtain a corner solution where all firms are active
in all market locations, i.e., qi = 1 for all i. Whenever there is such a corner
solution, f(h¯i) = (σ−1)−1(h¯i)σ−1L/Ξ−Q(1), according to (6). Thus, hyper-
segregation occurs if and only if σ > 2 (f is strictly convex) and symmetry
if and only if σ < 2 (f is strictly concave). Hence, the threshold intensity
of product market competition which must be exceeded to obtain asymmet-
ric sorting (σ = 2) is higher than the threshold σ = 2 − 1/η in the case
where there is no corner solution for market ranges under the specifications
in (5). Notably, however, in any case hypersegregated job assignment holds
for empirically relevant price markups.
We know already that high-productivity firms are active in more market
locations than low-productivity firms. If σ > 2−1/η, the market ranges of the
two firm types are given by q(h1) and q(h2), respectively, where q(h2) > q(h1).
It follows that high-productivity firms also have larger size when firm size
is measured by total employment (as often done in empirical studies). To
see this, recall from (4) that, for a firm i, stage 3 profits in m are πi,m =
li,m/(σ − 1). The amount of labor employed by firm i in an establishment
is thus proportional to stage 3 profits and in equilibrium given by l(h¯i) ≡
(σ − 1)π(h¯i). Thus, clearly, the higher productivity αi = h¯i of a firm is, the
more labor it employs in each establishment and thus also in total. Using
l(h¯i) = (σ−1)π(h¯i) together with (6) and (7), we find that total employment
in firm i is given by
lTotal(h¯i) ≡ s+ q(h¯i)l(h¯i) = s+
µ
(L/Ξ)η
(σ − 1)κη
¶ 1
η−1
(h¯i)
(σ−1)η
η−1 . (10)
To establish the empirical relevance of the model (section 6), the following
result (immediately implied by (10)) will be helpful.10
10The result also holds for the case where qi = 1 for all i discussed in Remark 1. In this
10
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Proposition 2. (Firm Size.) If σ > 2, then firm size, lTotal(h¯i), is
increasing and strictly convex in h¯i.
3.2 Does Equilibrium Job Assignment Maximize Wel-
fare?
The previous literature suggests that, under perfect competition, equilib-
rium job assignment is eﬃcient (e.g. Grossman and Maggi, 2000; Saint-Paul,
2001). The next result shows that this does not necessarily hold in the frame-
work analyzed here. The welfare analysis is confined to the case where firms
maximize profits at the product market competition stage. This ensures that
a potential ineﬃciency of equilibrium is not driven by the well-known fact
that output and prices, resulting from imperfect product market competition,
are generally set at ineﬃcient levels.
Consider a social planer which maximizes welfare by choosing, for the
equilibrium number of firms, firms’ market ranges under both hypersegre-
gated and symmetric job assignment (which are the two possible outcomes
which can occur in equilibrium, according to Proposition 1), taking into ac-
count subsequent monopolistic product market competition. The optimal
job assignment pattern is found by comparing the two resulting welfare lev-
els (one for hypersegregation, one for symmetry). Numerical analysis (the
most relevant results are reported in Appendix B) suggests that the corre-
sponding, maximal welfare level is typically higher than equilibrium welfare,
for two reasons. First, given the equilibrium allocation of skills (hyperseg-
regation or symmetry), market ranges are too low from a social point of
view. That is, the number of products oﬀered in each market location is too
low, as consumers “love variety” in the analyzed model.11 Second, it may
be the case (although not necessarily so) that welfare is maximized under
symmetry rather than hypersegregation, although the equilibrium job as-
signment is hypersegregated (i.e., although σ > 2− 1/η). Similarly, a social
planer may prefer hypersegregation to symmetry, although the equilibrium
job assignment is symmetric (i.e., although σ < 2− 1/η). These insights are
summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. (Welfare.) Consider welfare-maximizing job assignment
case, lTotal(h¯i) ≡ s+(σ− 1)π(h¯i), which is strictly convex in h¯i if σ > 2, according to (6).
11Hence, clearly, if the social planer could aﬀect costs to enter market locations, by
reducing κ, she would do so.
11
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and market ranges for the equilibrium number of firms, given that firms max-
imize profits at the product market competition stage. Equilibrium market
ranges are generally not welfare-maximizing for a given job assignment. The
equilibrium job assignment may or may not be welfare-maximizing.
The proof of this and all subsequent formal results are relegated to Ap-
pendix B.
Remark 2. Contrary to the case where market ranges of firms are lim-
ited, in a corner solution where qi = 1 for all i, the equilibrium job assignment
is always eﬃcient in the basic model. To see this, note that in the monopo-
listic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), with I goods and firms,
utility function (1) implies that welfare, U , reads U = E/[
R I
0
(pi)1−σdi]1/(1−σ),
where E = L +
R I
0
(π(αi)− κ− F ) di is aggregate nominal income (use
W = 1 and Q(1) = κ) and pi = (1 − 1/σ)−1(1/αi) is the price for good
i (see Appendix A). Using (6), Ξ =
R I
0
(αi)σ−1di and L = 1 − sI, we obtain
E = (1−1/σ)−1(1−sI)− (κ+F )I. Thus, combining pi = (1−1/σ)−1(1/αi)
with αi = h¯i, for any firm number I, U is maximized if
R I
0
b(h¯i)di, where
b(h) ≡ hσ−1, is maximized. As b(h) is strictly convex if σ > 2 and strictly
concave if σ < 2, for any given mass of workers with skill h1 and h2, U is
maximized under hypersegregation if σ > 2 and under symmetry if σ < 2.
From Remark 1, we know that hypersegregation indeed holds in equilibrium
if σ > 2 and symmetry prevails in equilibrium if σ < 2.
4 Comparative-Statics
Interestingly, starting from a symmetric equilibrium (which exists for a suﬃ-
ciently low value of σ), the model is capable to generate the following result.
If the price elasticity of demand σ increases such that the equilibrium becomes
asymmetric, some firms may actually increase their size, lTotal, by attracting
better managers on average, while other firms see their size shrink. Thus,
somewhat paradoxically, a higher intensity of product market competition,
in the sense that the price elasticity of product demand becomes higher and
thus price mark-up becomes lower, may give rise to the emergence of large,
high-productivity firms in the first place.
The remainder of this section examines, for a given type of equilibrium
(hypersegregation and symmetry), the determinants of both market ranges
12
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of firms and wage dispersion between high- and low-skilled workers. In par-
ticular, it addresses evidence on an increase in wages at the top of the wage
distribution, typically earned by nonproduction workers like managers (see
Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2007, further discussed in section 6). Two candidate
explanations, both related to the intensity of product market competition,
are explored: first, an increase in σ, reflecting lower price mark-ups, and
second, a downward shift in κ, reflecting a reduction in institutional barriers
to enter market locations.
As markets are symmetric ex ante, suppose the composition of firm types
is the same at each market location in equilibrium. Also, to make the analysis
interesting, the focus is on the case where both skill types, h1 and h2, are
hired as managers. Intuitively and as shown in the generalized model, all
high-skilled types are then employed as managers. Moreover, in a perfect
labor market, a low-skilled manager receives the same wage as production
workers, i.e., w(h1) = W = 1. w(h2) thus measures the wage premium for a
high skill.
Before examining this wage premium, the next proposition provides com-
parative-static results for market ranges and the equilibrium number of firms,
I. Market ranges are identical across firms in an equilibrium with symmet-
ric job assignment. In an equilibrium with hypersegregated job assignment,
they are given by q(h1) and q(h2) for low- and high-productivity firms, re-
spectively.
Proposition 4. (Market ranges). (i) In equilibrium with symmetric job
assignment, the market range of firms is decreasing in κ. (ii) In equilibrium
with hypersegregated job assignment, market ranges q(h1) and q(h2) are also
decreasing in κ. The relative market range q(h2)/q(h1) is increasing in σ
and independent of κ. (iii) The equilibrium number of firms ( I) is unrelated
to κ under both hypersegregated and symmetric job assignment.
Proposition 4 is consistent with the notion that firms extend their market
range if entry barriers to open establishments decline. For any given mar-
ket range qi, a decrease in κ lowers both the absolute costs Q(qi) and the
marginal costs Q0(qi) to enter market locations. Intuitively, an exogenous
decrease in Q would raise the number of firms, I. A decrease in Q0 would
increase market ranges and thereby, if Q remained the same, lower the num-
ber of entering firms by reducing profits in each location. Taken together,
13
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in the analyzed model, the equilibrium number of firms in the economy is
unaﬀected whereas market ranges unambiguously increase. In an equilibrium
where job assignment is hypersegregated, a decrease in κ implies that market
ranges of high- and low-productivity firms increase in the same proportion
such that the relative market range of the two types of firms, q(h2)/q(h1),
is unaﬀected. In contrast, if the price mark-up decreases (increase in σ),
productivity diﬀerences among firms become increasingly magnified in profit
diﬀerences. This transmits into rising diﬀerences in market ranges among
firms. Hence, q(h2)/q(h1) is increasing in σ.
We next turn to the eﬀect of changes in σ and κ on the wage premium
for a high skill, w(h2).
Proposition 5. (Wage inequality). Under both hypersegregated and
symmetric job assignment, w(h2) is increasing in σ and unrelated to κ.
Although the result holds for both types of equilibrium (hypersegregation
and symmetry), the intuition for the positive impact of an increase in σ (de-
crease in price mark-up) on wage premium w(h2) is rather diﬀerent across
the two types of equilibrium. If equilibrium job assignment is hypersegre-
gated, an increase in σ implies larger magnification eﬀects of diﬀerences in
productivity on profit diﬀerences. This means that, after an increase in σ, a
given relative skill h2/h1 has a higher eﬀect on the equilibrium skill premium,
as profits are related to manager wages.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the eﬀect of a higher σ on w(h2) is more
subtle. According to (9) and w(h1) = 1, we have w(h2)−1 = f 0(h¯)(h2−h1)/s,
where h¯ denotes the common average skill of the firms’ managers. A higher
σ implies that ceteris paribus less firms are able to enter the economy, due
to a first-order eﬀect on stage 3 profits. A lower firm number I has two
counteracting eﬀects on wage premium w(h2). First, since less low-skilled
managers are hired, average skill h¯ increases, which means that marginal
profit, f 0, declines. (Recall from Proposition 1 that f is strictly concave in
a symmetric equilibrium.) This has a negative eﬀect on w(h2). However, a
lower I ceteris paribus raises gross profits and under the specifications of the
model also increases marginal profit, f 0. This has a positive eﬀect on w(h2),
which turns out to dominate the first eﬀect.
In sum, the eﬀect of a increase in the price elasticity of demand on the
wage premium seems less robust in the case with symmetric firms than in
the case with hypersegregation. However, the case with symmetric firms
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is also the less relevant case from an empirical point of view, as discussed
in section 3.1. In any case, one may conclude from the analysis that an
increased intensity of product market competition which leads to lower price
mark-ups has the potential to explain the observed increases in the premia
for nonproduction skills.
In contrast, a decrease in barriers to enter markets, reflected by a lower κ,
leaves the skill premium w(h2) unaﬀected. In the case of hypersegregation,
zero net profits in equilibrium imply that relative gross profits, f(h2)/f(h1),
must equal relative sunk costs, (sw(h2) +F )/(s+F ). Since gross profits are
proportionally aﬀected when κ changes, w(h2) does not change. In symmetric
equilibrium, as the discussion of the eﬀect of a change in σ has suggested,
w(h2) can only change in equilibrium when the number of firms, I, changes.
However, I is independent κ (Proposition 4).
Remark 3.12 In the case where all firms are active in all market locations
(i.e., q(h¯) = 1 under symmetry and q(h1) = q(h2) = 1 under hypersegrega-
tion), w(h2) is again increasing in σ. With respect to the impact of a change
in κ, Proposition 5 does not hold. Since Q(1) = κ, a marginal change in κ
is qualitatively similar to a change in sunk cost to open a firm, F , as mar-
ket ranges cannot react if qi for all i. In this case, w(h2) is increasing in κ.
However, this result seems to be of minor interest.
5 Generalized Model
The central Proposition 1 in section 3 has been derived from intuitive rea-
soning. This section provides a rigorous treatment, including the derivation
of the wage schedule. It abstains from making specifications on functions a
and Q and allows for more than two skill types, K > 2. Moreover, it works
with profit functions at the product market competition stage 3 in a reduced
form, rather than with (4).
In line with the analysis of the basic model, we require that the following
holds. First, obviously, an equilibrium at stage 3 has to exist. Second, stage
3 profits of a firm are the same in any market location the firm is active (no
arbitrage at stage 2). Third, diﬀerences among firms can be characterized by
a single quality index, αi = a(h¯i), again called productivity, where stage 3
12The following claims can be proven in a way which is analogous to the proof of Propo-
sition 5.
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profits of firm i are increasing in αi. Finally, if productivity or market ranges
increase for a non-zero mass of rival firms, stage 3 profits of a firm decline.
More precisely, define a mapping z ≡ (α,q) which for each firm j gives us a
pair (αj, qj); α: I → R+, j 7−→ αj; q: I → (0, 1], j 7−→ qj.13 We assume:
Assumption 1. For any z, there exists a real-valued function π(αi| z),
so that πi,m = π(αi| z) for all m ∈ [0, 1] if i is active in m, and π satisfies the
following properties: (i) ∂π(αi| ·)/∂αi > 0; (ii) for z = (α,q), z0 = (α0,q0),
we have π( ·| z) = π( ·| z0) if αj = α0j and qj = q0j for almost all j ∈ I, and
π( ·| z) > π( ·| z0) if αj ≤ α0j and qj ≤ q0j with at least one strict inequality
holding for a positive mass of firms j ∈ I.
At stage 2, optimal market range q(αi| z) ≡ argmax0≤qi≤1{qiπ(αi| z) −
Q(qi)} is given by first-order condition
π(αi| z) ≥ Q0(qi), (11)
which is binding if qi < 1, i ∈ I.14 Note that q(αi| z) < 1 is possible only if
Q(qi) is strictly convex for at least some qi ∈ (0, 1].15 Given mapping α, in
equilibrium, the optimal choices of firms’ market range, leading to z, must be
consistent with stage 3 profits under these optimal choices, π(αi| z). Denote
equilibrium profits of a firm i ∈ I at stage 2 (gross profits) by16
Π(αi| z) ≡ q(αi| z)π(αi| z)−Q(q(αi| z)). (12)
Proposition 6. (Gross profits and market ranges). For all i ∈ I, in
equilibrium at stage 2, (i) ∂q(αi| z)/∂αi ≥ 0, and (ii) ∂Π(αi| z)/∂αi > 0.
Proposition 6 confirms in a more general way the result from the basic
model that high-productivity firms do not only have higher gross profits
13In the basic model, mapping z has determined aggregate variables L and Ξ, which
have been taken as given by firms in their decisions at stages 1 and 2.
14Apply the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. Clearly, π(αi| z) > Q0(0) and thus qi > 0 for a firm
i in any equilibrium, because otherwise a firm would not enter the economy in the first
place.
15To see this, suppose to the contrary that Q(·) would not be strictly convex somewhere.
Then π(αi| z) ≥ Q0(1) and qi = 1 would hold.
16Note that Π(αi| z) > 0 for all i ∈ I, according to (11), π(αi| z) > Q0(0), the convexity
of Q(·) and Q(0) = 0.
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˜ ˜
but also, if anything, wider market ranges than low-productivity firms. If
Q(·) is strictly convex everywhere, then αi > αj implies qi > qj whenever
qj < 1. To derive more generally than in section 3 the conditions under
which in equilibrium firms may indeed diﬀer in productivity αi, the following
auxiliary result will prove helpful.
Lemma 1. (Convexity). If ∂2π(αi| z)/∂α2i > 0 then ∂2Π(αi| z)/∂α2i >
0.
The firms’ decision problem at stage 1 is to hire a mass s of managers,
which determines productivity, αi. First, define a class of “assignment func-
tions”
G ≡ {g : H→ [0, s] | g˜(h) ≤ g(h) for all h ∈ H and
X
h∈H
g˜(h) = s}. (13)
(Recall that g(h) is the supply of workers with managerial skill h ∈ H in
the economy.) G˜ describes the feasible hiring policies of a firm. At stage
1, each firm i ∈ I chooses an assignment function g˜i ∈ G˜. Depending on
this hiring policy, the average skill level of managers in firm i is given by
h¯i = (1/s)
P
˜h∈H hg ˜i(h). As αi = a(h¯i), the set of functions {gi ∈ G˜ | i ∈ I},
determines the mapping α. It is helpful to redefine gross profits as function
of a firm’s average skill level h¯i, i.e.,
f( h¯i
¯
z) ≡ Π(a(h¯i)
¯
z).
˜ ˜
(14)
There is an outside earnings option for all individuals not assigned as man-
agers which is normalized to unity, W = 1. We are now ready to set up
conditions for an equilibrium at stage 1. Equilibrium values are indicated by
superscript (*).
Definition 1. (Equilibrium at stage 1). An equilibrium set of assignment
functions {g∗i ∈ G | i ∈ I}, together with a mapping w: H → R+ (wage
schedule), fulfills the following conditions: (a) Net profits are zero, i.e., for
all i ∈ I,
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗) =
X
h∈H
w(h)g˜∗i (h) + F, (15)
where h¯∗i = (1/s)
P
˜h∈H hg
∗
i (h) and z
∗ = (α∗,q∗), with α∗i = a(h¯
∗
i ) and
q∗i = q(α
∗
i | z∗). (b) Given z∗, no profitable deviation exists, i.e., for all g˜0i ∈ G˜
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and for all i ∈ I,
f( h¯0i
¯
z∗) ≤
X
h∈H
w(h)g˜0i(h) + F, (16)
where h¯0i = (1/s)
P
˜h∈H hg
0
i(h). (c) For all h ∈ H, the following holds: w(h) ≥
1; if w(h) > 1, then
R
i∈I g˜
∗
i (h)di = g(h); if
R
˜
i∈I g˜
∗
i (h)di < g(h), thenw(h) = 1.
Condition (a) of Definition 1 means that the sum of fixed entry costs
F and the total wage bill for managers employed in a firm (i.e., endogenous
sunk cost at stage 1) is equal to its gross profit, i.e., net profits of all firms are
zero in equilibrium because of free entry. As potential entrants are identical
ex ante, the only possibility for a firm to earn higher profits than other firms
is to attract higher-skilled managers on average. Higher gross profits of a
firm transmit into a higher average wage per manager of a firm. Condition
(b) reflects that, at stage 1, each firm maximizes profits taking both z = z∗
and the wage schedule w(h), h ∈ H, as given. To motivate this, note that
for any given wage schedule w(h), h ∈ H, no firm i wants to deviate from
g∗i ∈ G˜ (which leads to average skill h¯∗i ) if and only if
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)−
X
h∈H
w(h)g˜∗i (h) ≥ f( h¯0i
¯
z∗)−
X
h∈H
w(h)g˜0i(h) (17)
for all alternative assignment functions g˜0i ∈ G˜ (leading to h¯0i). Inequality (16)
follows from (17) by using (15). According to condition (c), all h ∈ H from
the potential pool of managers must at least receive the outside option, W =
1. (This implies that sunk costs at stage 1 are bounded from below by s+F .)
Condition (c) also says that all workers of type h are employed as manager
if their wage exceeds outside wage option W = 1. To motivate this, suppose
w(h) > 1 and
R
i∈I g˜
∗
i (h)di < g(h). This means that there is excess supply for
nonproduction positions as workers seek the highest wage. However, this is
inconsistent with a Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market. In contrast,
if w(h) = 1 for some type h, then this type is indiﬀerent whether or not to
be assigned as manager.
We are now ready to derive the equilibrium wage structure. Define Si ≡
{h ∈ H : g˜∗i (h) > 0}, the set of skill levels hired as manager in equilibrium
by firm i ∈ I. The set of skills assigned to nonproduction tasks reads Θ ≡
∪i∈ISi. At stage 1, each firm i ∈ I chooses an assignment function g˜i ∈ G˜ by
maximizing net profits f( h¯i
¯
z)−
P
h∈H g˜i(h)w(h)−F , taking as given z and
w(h), h ∈ H. Observing Definition 1, we can characterize the equilibrium
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wage schedule as follows.
Lemma 2. (Wage schedule). In equilibrium, for all i ∈ I, (i)
w(h) ≥
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F
s
+
∂f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
¯¯
¯
h¯i=h¯∗i
h− h¯∗i
s
(18)
for all h ∈ Θ, with equality if h ∈ Si; (ii) there exists hk ∈ H such that
h ∈ Θ for all h ≥ hk and h /∈ Θ for all h < hk; (iii) w(h) > 1 for all
h > hk; (iv) w(h¯∗i ) =
£
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F
¤
/s.
Lemma 2 confirms and generalizes the wage schedule discussed in section
3 for the basic model. According to part (i) of Lemma 2, within a firm,
the wage schedule of managers is colinear. As already mentioned in the
discussion of (9), this is an implication of the assumption that productivity
of firm i, αi, depends on the average skill level, h¯i, it hires. The right-hand
side of (18) gives the marginal benefit from hiring a nonproduction worker of
type h for a firm with average skill level h¯∗i under the zero-profit condition
(15). Thus, in equilibrium, type h is not employed in such a firm if wage w(h)
exceeds this marginal benefit. Part (ii) states that there exists an endogenous
minimum skill level hk assigned as nonproduction worker and all individuals
with h > hk are hired as manager. According to part (iii), workers whose
skill exceeds hk have strictly higher earnings than their outside opportunity
in equilibrium (whereas w(hk) = 1 if some workers of type hk are not assigned
as nonproduction worker, according to condition (c) of Definition 1). Finally,
part (iv) states that any worker of type h¯∗i must obtain a wage rate equal to
the average wage per nonproduction worker in firm i (whether or not type
h¯∗i is actually employed in firm i).
Recall that an equilibrium job assignment is called hypersegregated if all
firms hire a single skill type only and is called symmetric if average equilib-
rium managerial skill, h¯∗i , is the same for all i ∈ I. Armed with the results
of Lemma 2, we can confirm Proposition 1 from the basic model, for an
arbitrarily high number of skill types K, as follows.
Proposition 7. (Sorting). In any equilibrium, job assignment is hy-
persegregated (symmetric) if gross profit function f( h¯i
¯
z∗) is strictly convex
(strictly concave) in h¯i.
For instance, if product market competition is such that profits at stage
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3, π(αi| ·), are strictly convex as function of αi (which holds for σ > 2 in
the basic model, according to (6)) and a(h) = h as assumed in section 3,
then f( h¯i
¯ ·) is strictly convex in h¯i, according to (14) and Lemma 1. As
a result, and in line with Proposition 1, firms are completely segregated by
skill in equilibrium. In turn, firms diﬀer in gross profits and, possibly, in
market ranges, according to Proposition 6. If the equilibrium job assignment
is hypersegregated, wages of managers are related to gross profits according
to w(h) = [f(h| ·)− F ] /s, h ∈ Θ.
Remark 4. According to the preceding analysis, product market char-
acteristics (reflected by stage 3 profits π(αi| ·)) are the driving force towards
asymmetry. One purpose of this paper (in addition to address important
stylized facts, see section 6) is to demonstrate that asymmetric sorting can
arise under empirically observed price markups and imperfect competition
even in absence of technological complementarities (e.g. if a(h) = h). To see
the relation to previous job assignment literature, which highlighted the role
of technological complementarities for asymmetric job assignment equilibria
rather than the role of the product market, consider the following pure labor
market model. Let a
¡
h¯i
¢
now denote output of a homogenous (numeraire)
good, produced under perfect competition, where h¯i is the average skill level
of workers producing this good. (There are no nonproduction workers.) That
is, in terms of the present analysis, f( h¯i
¯ ·) ≡ a ¡h¯i¢, F = 0 and W = 0. As
argued in Saint-Paul (2001), in this model the case a00 (·) > 0 leads to sim-
ilar results as the supermodular production function introduced by Kremer
(1993). It has the interpretation that workers exert intrafirm spillovers on
each other at all skill levels. According to Proposition 7, in such a labor
market model, the way workers are sorted in equilibrium immediately fol-
lows from the properties of production function a(·), i.e., hypersegregation
(symmetry) occurs if a00 (·) > (<)0. By design, only technology plays a role
for the sorting of workers.
The final result provides a sorting property which allows for the general
case where the gross profit function is not strictly convex everywhere or
strictly concave everywhere, i.e., there is not necessarily hypersegregation or
symmetry in equilibrium.
Proposition 8. (General sorting property). In equilibrium, if h¯∗i > h¯
∗
j
for some i, j ∈ I and hl ∈ Si, then h ≤ hl for all h ∈ Sj; moreover, if
h¯∗i > h¯
∗
j and h
k ∈ Sj, then h ≥ hk for all h ∈ Si.
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Although the context is diﬀerent (see Remark 4), the result is in line with
the labor market model in Saint-Paul (2001). It says that in any asymmet-
ric equilibrium apart from hypersegregation, no skill level hired by a more
productive firm can be lower than the highest skill hired by a less productive
firm. Similarly, no skill level hired by a less productive firm can be higher
than the lowest skill hired by a more productive firm. This implies that we
can partition the set of skills hired as manager, Θ, into adjacent subsets and
that firms which diﬀer in productivity hire managerial skills from diﬀerent
subsets.
6 Relation to Stylized Facts
This section relates the implications of the analysis to five widely-recognized
stylized facts.
1. Size distribution of firms. As frequently found in numerous studies, the
size distribution of firms within industries is highly skewed.17 The predictions
of the basic model are consistent with this observation. To see this, suppose
strict convexity of stage 3 profits, and thus of gross profits, as a function of
a firm’s productivity (Lemma 1). For observed price mark-ups, this is the
case in the basic model (σ > 2). Strict convexity of profit functions gives rise
to hypersegregation of the equilibrium job assignment (Propositions 1 and
7). Also suppose the mass function g(h), which characterizes the supply of
manager skills, is decreasing for all h ∈ Θ (i.e., in the upper tale of the skill
type distribution which contains the types hired as managers). That is, there
are many mediocre and relatively few brilliant managers. Then, since firm
size lTotal(h) of a firm which only hires managers of skill h is increasing in
h, the density function of firm size in the economy is decreasing (where size
is measured by total employment). According to Proposition 2, as lTotal(h)
is strictly convex, in addition, the firm size distribution function tends to be
convex. Consequently, the firm size distribution tends to be skewed to the
right.
For instance, suppose that g(h) is co-linear for h > hk, i.e. has the form
g(h) = β − γ · h, β, γ > 0. Denote the number of firms with firm size lTotal
by m(lTotal). According to (10), lTotal(h) has the form lTotal(h) = s + c · hυ
with c > 0 and, if σ > 2, υ > 1. Define the inverse of this function,
17See Sutton (1997) for an excellent survey of this literature.
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h˜(lTotal) ≡
£
(lTotal − s)/c
¤1/υ
. Under hypersegregation, there are g(h)/s firms
which hire only skill h > hk as manager. Hence, the number of firms with
size lTotal is given by
m(lTotal) =
g(h˜(lTotal))
s
= β˜ − γ˜ · £(lTotal − s)¤1/υ , (19)
β˜ ≡ β/s, γ˜ ≡ γ · c−1/υ/s. Thus, m0(lTotal) < 0 and, as υ > 1, m00(lTotal) >
0. These properties prevail more generally whenever g(h) is decreasing and
convex (or at least not “too concave”).
2. Firm size and productivity. Baily et al. (1992) find that the size of
U.S. manufacturing firms is positively related to their total factor productiv-
ity (see their Tab. 8 and 9). Moreover, Roberts and Supina (2000) report a
negative correlation between marginal costs and firm size among U.S. manu-
facturing firms. Our analysis consistent with empirical findings of a positive
relationship between firms’ productivity and size (Proposition 2).
3. Sorting of managers. Evidence from matched employer-employee
data strongly suggests that larger firms employ workers with higher aver-
age skill levels (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999; Troske, 1999).
O’Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001) explicitly look at a measure for
managerial skills, which is an index combining formal education with job
requirements like problem-solving skills and predictability of tasks, known as
‘Hay points’. They find that average managerial skill levels substantially dif-
fer across firms. This supports the asymmetric sorting hypothesis elaborated
upon in this paper.
4. Firm size and wages. The analysis suggests that the higher the aver-
age skill of managers in a firm i is, the higher are both the average wage per
manager, [f(h¯i)− F ]/s, and firm size, lTotal(h¯i). Indeed, a positive relation-
ship between firm size and wages is a stylized fact (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz
and Margolis, 1999; Troske, 1999). For instance, Troske (1999) controls for
many firm-specific characteristics which have been suggested by economic
theory on size-wage diﬀerentials, still finding a substantial impact of firm
size on wages. A considerable part of this ‘size premium’ seems to be re-
lated to imperfectly observable skills, like managerial talent, together with
a clustering of skilled workers in large firms. Consistent with this explana-
tion, O’Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001) find that their measure of
managerial skills (‘Hay points’) is a good predictor for wages. Also at the
CEO level, larger firms pay substantially higher salary (Conyon and Murphy,
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2000).
5. Rising top wage income shares. Finally, Piketty and Saez (2003, 2007)
provide evidence that the income share of the top decile of the U.S. pre-
tax wage income distribution has increased dramatically in the last decades.
For instance, whereas the top decile share of wage and salary income was 28
percent in 1980, it fairly gradually increased to 36 percent in 2000. Moreover,
whereas average wage income increased only slightly in this time period,
CEO pay has increased dramatically. According to Piketty and Saez (2007),
average wage income of a full time-equivalent increased from US$ 33,023 in
1980 to US$ 38,846 in 2000 (in 2000 dollars). In the same time period, the
average wage of the top 100 CEO’s increased from US$ 3.34 million to US$
40.38 million.18 Conyon and Murphy (2000) show that manager wages have
surged recently also in the UK. Proposition 5 has addressed these important
trends. It suggests that wage premia for nonproduction skills have surged
as a consequence of increases in the intensity of product market competition
which is reflected by a decrease in price mark-ups (increase in σ). Recent
evidence by Cunat and Guadalupe (2006) supports the view that changes
in the product market have aﬀected the compensation at the top of the
distribution. They find that an increase in foreign competition (captured by
a firm-specific measure of import penetration) increases the remuneration of
CEO’s in a firm and raises the reward for talent. That changes in product
markets can account for the upward trend in manager remuneration until
the year 2000 is an alternative to explanations which rest on technological
changes (e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004).
7 Conclusion
Ability of managers and other nonproduction professionals is key for the
productivity of firms. Hence, the assignment of heterogeneous nonproduction
workers across firms determines the distribution of productivity. In turn, the
transmission of productivity diﬀerences into profit diﬀerences — resulting from
product market competition — determines firms’ willingness to pay for higher
nonproduction skills.
18The upward trend in wage payments at the top in the U.S. seems to have reversed
recently, however. Evidence suggests that the top decile wage income share has been 33.9
percent in 2002 (down from 36 percent in 2000) and the top 100 CEO’s earned on average
“only” US$ 18.5 million (Piketty and Saez, 2007).
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This paper has proposed a theory which suggests that the coexistence of
large, high-productivity firms and small, low-productivity firms may derive
from an asymmetric equilibrium assignment of nonproduction skills which
results from this interaction. The analysis has shown that an asymmetric
equilibrium assignment typically arises — despite symmetry of potential en-
trants ex ante — when gross profits of a firm are strictly convex as a function
of the firm’s productivity. In the monopolistic competition framework of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), this property arises for observed price mark-ups.
It has been argued that the predictions of the model are consistent with a
number of stylized facts: a skewed firm size distribution as well as a positive
relationship of firm size to productivity, manager quality, and manager re-
muneration. Comparative-static exercises suggest that observed increases in
the compensation at the top of the distribution can be led back to a higher
intensity of product market competition which is reflected by lower price
mark-ups.
Appendix
A. Derivation of Equation (4)
Let Em be total consumption expenditure in m and pi,m the price for variety
i in market m. (1) implies that firm i faces in market m demand function
xi,m =
Em (pi,m)
−σR Nm
0
(pi,m)1−σdi
, (A.1)
Firms take both aggregate expenditure Em and the denominator in (A.1) as
given when setting prices. With marginal cost 1/αi, we obtain the standard
mark-up price (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977)
pi,m =
1
αi
σ
σ − 1 , (A.2)
i ∈ [0, Nm]. Using both equations (A.1) and (A.2), for any i, j ∈ [0, Nm],
xi,m/xj,m = (αi/αj)
σ. Moreover, according to production function (2), we
have xi,m/xj,m = αili,m/(αjlj,m). Thus, lj,m = (αj/αi)
σ−1 li,m. Consequently,
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Lm =
R Nm
0
lj,mdj = li,mα
1−σ
i
R Nm
0
(αj)σ−1dj, which yields
li,m =
Lm(αi)σ−1R Nm
0
(αj)σ−1dj
. (A.3)
Now use (2) and (A.2) to find that profit of firm i in m, πi,m = (pi,m −
1/αi)xi,m is given by πi,m = li,m/(σ− 1). This, together with (A.3), confirms
(4). ¥
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3: We need to find welfare under both symmetry
and hypersegregation for a given allocation of skills and market ranges. First,
note that, with single-product firms,
R
m∈[0,1]Nmdm =
R
i∈I qidi holds. Let us
focus on the case where the firm composition is the same in each market and
therefore Nm = N for all m. Thus, the number of products in each market
is
N =
Z
i∈I
qidi. (A.4)
Moreover, substituting (A.1) into (1), welfare in each market (suppressing
index m) is given by U = E/[
R N
0
(pi)1−σdi]1/(1−σ). Expenditure E is equal
to nominal wage income of production workers, L (recall W = 1), plus total
gross profits of firms net of F (being equal to manager wages under free
entry). Thus, E = L +
R I
0
(qiπ(αi)−Q(qi)− F ) di. Using (6) as well as
(A.2) and observing αi = h¯i, we obtain
U =
⎛
⎝L+
IZ
0
∙
qi(h¯i)σ−1
σ − 1
L
Ξ
−Q(qi)
¸
di− IF
⎞
⎠ σ − 1
σ
Ξ
1
σ−1 , (A.5)
where Ξ =
R N
0
(h¯i)σ−1di. Denote by gˆ(h1) the mass of workers with skill h1
hired as manager. The mass of workers with skill h2 hired as manager is
equal to total supply of skill h2, g(h2). Thus, the equilibrium number of
firms in the economy reads
I =
gˆ(h1) + g(h2)
s
. (A.6)
25
Grossmann: Firm Size, Productivity, and Manager Wages
ˆˆ
Welfare under symmetry: The average managerial skill under symmetry
is given by
h¯ =
h1g(h1) + h2g(h2)
g(h1) + g(h2)
. (A.7)
Moreover, we have Ξ = Nh¯σ−1. In addition, (A.4) implies N = qI, where q
denotes the common market range of all firms under symmetry. Hence, using
Q(q) = κqη in (A.5), welfare under symmetry, denoted by USym, is
USym =
µ
L− σ − 1
σ
IF − σ − 1
σ
κqη
¶
(qI)
1
σ−1 h¯, (A.8)
ˆ
ˆ
where h¯ is given by (A.7), I by (A.6) and L = 1− sI.
Welfare under hypersegregation: Under hypersegregation, there are firms
g(h1)/s firms which hire type h1 and g(h2)/s firms which hire type h2. De-
note by q1 and q2 the market range of the former and the latter firm type,
respectively. Hence, according to (A.4), the number of products (and active
firms) in each market location is
N =
q1g(h1) + q2g(h2)
s
. (A.9)
In each location there is a share N/I of the existing firms. Using Ξ =R N
0
(h¯i)σ−1di with h¯i = h1 for the gˆ(h1)/s firms which hire type h1 and h¯i = h2
for the g(h2)/s firms which hire type h2 we have
Ξ =
N
I
µ
gˆ(h1)
s
(h1)σ−1 +
g(h2)
s
(h2)σ−1
¶
. (A.10)
ˆ
ˆ
Substituting (A.6) and (A.9) into (A.10), we obtain
Ξ =
q1g(h1) + q2g(h2)
g(h1) + g(h2)
µ
gˆ(h1)
s
(h1)σ−1 +
g(h2)
s
(h2)σ−1
¶
. (A.11)
Moreover, under hypersegregation,
IZ
0
qi(h¯i)
σ−1di =
gˆ(h1)
s
q1(h1)σ−1 +
g(h2)
s
q2(h2)σ−1. (A.12)
Substituting (A.12) into (A.5) and observing Q(q) = κqη, welfare under
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hypersegregation, denoted by UHyp, is
UHyp =
σ − 1
σ
Ξ
1
σ−1
Ã
L+
L
Ξ
gˆ(h1)
s q
1(h1)σ−1 + g(h
2)
s q
2(h2)σ−1
σ − 1 −
gˆ(h1)
s
κ(q1)η − g(h
2)
s
κ(q2)η − IF
¶
, (A.13)
where Ξ is given by (A.11), I by (A.6) and L = 1− sI.
Equilibrium market range q and firm number I under symmetry: Un-
der symmetry, using Ξ = Nh¯σ−1, we obtain π(h¯) = (σ − 1)−1h¯σ−1L/Ξ =
(σ − 1)−1L/N . Optimality condition (7) implies q(h¯) =
¡
π(h¯)/(κη)
¢ 1
η−1 .
Substituting π(h¯) = (σ − 1)−1L/N into this equation, using N = qI as well
as L = 1− sI, and solving for q, we obtain
q =
∙
1− sI
κη (σ − 1) I
¸ 1
η
(A.14)
for the equilibrium market range under symmetry. We next derive gˆ(h1) and
thereby I. According to (9), we have sw(h) + F = f(h¯) + f 0(h¯)(h − h¯),
h ∈ {h1, h2}. Using the expression for f(h¯i) in (8), this can be written as
sw(h) + F = f(h¯)
∙
1 +
(σ − 1)η
η − 1
µ
h
h¯
− 1
¶¸
. (A.15)
Substituting Ξ = Nh¯σ−1 and L = 1− sI into (8) and using N = qI together
with the expression for q from (A.14), we find
f(h¯) =
(η − 1)(1− sI)
(σ − 1) ηI . (A.16)
Combining (A.15) and (A.16) implies
w(h) =
(η − 1)(1− sI)
(σ − 1) ηsI
∙
1 +
(σ − 1)η
η − 1
µ
h
h¯
− 1
¶¸
− F
s
. (A.17)
Substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.17) and evaluating at h = h1 by making
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use of the fact that w(h1) = 1, we find
1 =
(η − 1) [1− gˆ(h1)− g(h2)]
(σ − 1) η(gˆ(h1) + g(h2))
µ
1− (σ − 1)η
η − 1
¶
ˆ
+
1− gˆ(h1)− g(h2)
h1g(h1) + h2g(h2)
h1− F
s
.
(A.18)
(A.18) implicitly defines gˆ(h1) under a symmetric job assignment in equilib-
rium.
Equilibrium market ranges and firm number under hypersegregation: Sub-
stituting π(αi) = (σ − 1)−1(αi)σ−1L/Ξ into q(αi) = (π(αi)/κη)
1
η−1 from (7),
we find that q(h1) and q(h2) are given by
q(h1) =
∙
(h1)σ−1
(σ − 1)κη
L
Ξ
¸ 1
η−1
, q(h2) =
µ
h2
h1
¶σ−1
η−1
q(h1). (A.19)
Observing that net profits are zero due to free entry and using w(h1) = 1,
we have f(h1) = s+ F , where
f(h1) =
η − 1
κ
1
η−1
µ
(L/Ξ)(h1)σ−1
(σ − 1)η
¶ η
η−1
, (A.20)
according to (8). From (A.19), we get L/Ξ = (q(h1))η−1(σ − 1)κη/(h1)σ−1.
Substituting this into (A.20), condition f(h1) = s+F can be solved for q(h1)
to obtain
q(h1) =
∙
s+ F
(η − 1)κ
¸ 1
η
.
ˆ
(A.21)
Now substitute (A.11) together with (A.21) and L = 1−sI = 1−g(h1)−g(h2)
into the expression for q(h1) in (A.19). Then use q(h2) = (h2/h1)
σ−1
η−1 q(h1)
with q(h1) as given by (A.21) together with the fact that, in equilibrium,
q1 = q(h1) and q2 = q(h2). This yields gˆ(h1), which is implicitly given by
(σ − 1)(1 + F/s)η
η − 1
"
gˆ(h1) + g(h2)
µ
h2
h1
¶σ−1
η−1
#"
gˆ(h1) + g(h2)
µ
h2
h1
¶σ−1#
=
£
1− gˆ(h1) + g(h2)
¤ £
gˆ(h1) + g(h2)
¤
. (A.22)
Numerical results: The numerical results in Tab. 1 and 2 follow from
the expressions derived, for the parameter specifications: F = 0.1, κ = 1,
η = 4, h1 = 1, h2 = 2, g(h2) = 0.05. Variables with a ‘hat’ denote welfare-
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maximizing levels. That is, qˆ1 and qˆ2 are the welfare-maximizing market
ranges of firms which hire only managers with skill h1 and h2, respectively,
given that job assignment is hypersegregated. qˆ is the welfare-maximizing
market range under symmetric job assignment. UˆHyp and UˆSym are resulting
utility levels. Variables without a ‘hat’ denote equilibrium levels.
I q USym qˆ1 qˆ2 qˆ UˆHyp UˆSym
s = 0.1 4.1 0.52 2.172 0.57 0.62 0.82 1.868 3.838
s = 0.6 0.92 0.71 0.154 0.64 0.76 0.81 0.211 0.206
Table 1: σ = 1.5 (symmetric equilibrium job assignment)
I q(h1) q(h2) UHyp qˆ1 qˆ2 qˆ UˆHyp UˆSym
s = 0.1 2.2 0.51 0.64 0.851 0.56 0.67 0.72 0.862 1.046
s = 0.6 0.59 0.70 0.88 0.263 0.78 0.92 0.71 0.269 0.234
Table 2: σ = 2 (hypersegregated equilibrium job assignment)
As η = 4, Proposition 1 implies that equilibrium job assignment is hy-
persegregated if σ > 1.75 and symmetric if σ < 1.75. Tab. 1 and 2 show
that equilibrium market ranges are too low from a social point of view un-
der the equilibrium job assignment. Moreover, according to Tab. 1, which
refers to σ = 1.5, if s = 0.6, then UˆHyp > UˆSym, although equilibrium job
assignment is symmetric. However, if s = 0.1, then UˆHyp < UˆSym, show-
ing that equilibrium job assignment may be welfare-maximizing (although
equilibrium market ranges are not). According to Tab. 2, which refers to
σ = 2, if s = 0.1, then UˆHyp < UˆSym, although equilibrium job assignment
is hypersegregated. However, if s = 0.6, then UˆHyp > UˆSym. This concludes
the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Part (i). Equation (A.18) implies that gˆ(h1)
is independent of κ. Hence, from (A.6), also I is independent of κ. Using
(A.14), this implies that in equilibrium q is decreasing in κ. This confirms
part (i).
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Part (ii). Since q(h2)/q(h1) = (h2/h1)
σ−1
η−1 and h2 > h1, q(h2)/q(h1) is
increasing in σ. Using (A.21) and q(h2) = (h2/h1)
σ−1
η−1 q(h1) from (A.19), we
find that both q(h1) and q(h2) are decreasing in κ. This confirms part (ii).
Part (iii): For the symmetric equilibrium job assignment, see the proof of
part (i). For the hypersegregated equilibrium job assignment, (A.22) implies
that gˆ(h1) and therefore I are independent of κ. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: The result is first proven for the hyperseg-
regation case. In this case, free entry implies f(h1) = s + F and f(h2) =
sw(h2) + F . Hence, according to (8),
∙
f(h2)
f(h1)
=
¸µ
h2
h1
¶ (σ−1)η
η−1
=
w(h2) + F/s
1 + F/s
. (A.23)
Comparative-static results for the hypersegregation case follow.
For the symmetry case, substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.17) and
evaluating at h = h2, we obtain
w(h2) =
(η − 1)(1− gˆ(h1)− g(h2))
(σ − 1) η(gˆ(h1) + g(h2))
µ
1− (σ − 1)η
η − 1
¶
+
ˆ
1− gˆ(h1)− g(h2)
h1g(h1) + h2g(h2)
h2 − F
s
. (A.24)
Using (A.18), this can be rewritten as
ˆ
w(h2) =
1− gˆ(h1)− g(h2)
h1g(h1) + h2g(h2)
(h2 − h1). (A.25)
ˆ ˆ
The right-hand side of (A.25) is decreasing in gˆ(h1) and independent of both
σ and κ. Moreover, recall from Proposition 1 that 1 > (σ − 1)η/(η − 1)
must hold in the symmetry case. Hence, the right-hand side of (A.18) is
decreasing in gˆ(h1). Applying the implicit function theorem to (A.18), we
thus find ∂g(h1)/∂σ < 0. In addition, ∂g(h1)/∂κ = 0. Using these facts
together with (A.25) confirms the result also for the symmetry case. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Part (ii) is proven first. If qi = q(αi| z) ∈
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(0, 1), such that condition (11) is binding and Q00(qi) > 0 must hold, we have
∂q(αi| z)
∂αi
=
∂π(αi| z)/∂αi
Q00(qi)
> 0, (A.26)
according to ∂π(αi| ·)/∂αi > 0 from Assumption 1 and the implicit function
theorem. To prove part (i), note from (11) that, whenever qi = q(αi| z) ∈
(0, 1),
∂Π(αi| z)
∂αi
=
∂qi
∂αi
[π(αi| z)−Q0(qi)] + qi∂π(αi| z)∂αi (A.27)
is strictly positive, according to ∂π(αi| ·)/∂αi > 0, ∂q(αi| z)/∂αi > 0 and
condition (11). If qi = 1 in equilibrium, then part (i) immediately follows.
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: First, note that
∂2Π(αi| z)
∂α2i
=
∂qi
∂αi
∂π(αi| z)
∂αi
+ qi
∂2π(αi| z)
∂α2i
+
∂2qi
∂α2i
[π(αi| z)−Q0(qi)] +
∂qi
∂αi
∙
∂π(αi| z)
∂αi
−Q00(qi)
∂qi
∂αi
¸
, (A.28)
according to (A.27). If qi = q(αi| z) < 1, then both terms in square brackets
in (A.28) vanish, according to (11) and (A.26). If qi = 1, the latter two
summands in (A.28) also vanish, since ∂qi/∂αi = 0 in this case. Thus, using
∂qi/∂αi ≥ 0 (from part (ii) of Proposition 1), ∂2Π(αi| z)/∂α2i > 0 if π(αi| z)
is strictly convex in αi. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Part (i) is proven first. At stage 1, taking z as
given, each firm i ∈ I chooses an assignment function g˜i ∈ G˜ (determining
h¯i and αi = a(h¯i)) by solving
max
g˜(h), h∈H
(
f
Ã
1
s
X
h∈H
˜hg(h)
¯¯
¯ z
!
−
X
h∈H
g˜(h)w(h)− F
)
s.t. (A.29)
g˜(h) ≥ 0 for all h ∈ H, and
X
h∈H
g˜(h) = s. (A.30)
Setting up the Kuhn-Tucker problemwith multiplier λi for firm i for the latter
constraint in (A.30), we obtain from the necessary optimality conditions for
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g˜i(h), h ∈ H, that in equilibrium
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
h
s
− w(h) ≤ λi (A.31)
with strict equality if g˜∗i (h) > 0. This implies the following. Either each firm
i hires only one type of nonproduction worker or for any two diﬀerent types
h, hˆ ∈ Si, we have
w(h)− w(hˆ) =
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
h− hˆ
s
. (A.32)
Multiplying both sides of (A.31) with g˜∗i (h) and summing over all h ∈ H
yields
sλi =
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
h¯i −
X
h∈H
w(h)g˜∗i (h), (A.33)
where
P
h∈H g˜
∗
i (h) = s and h¯
∗
i = (1/s)
P
˜
ˆ
h∈H hg
∗
i (h) have been used. Com-
bining (A.33) with (A.31) and observing condition (a) of Definition 1 yields
(18). This proves part (i).
In order to prove part (ii), first, suppose there exist types h ∈ Θ and
h /∈ Θ such that h < ˆ
ˆ
h. It is shown in a first step that this is only possible if
w(h) < w(h). For this end, suppose w(h) ≥ w(ˆ
˜
h) and suppose firm i replaces
some managers of type h by some of type hˆ, choosing an assignment function
g0i ∈ G instead of g∗i ∈ G˜. Total wage costs of firm i are then given byX
h∈H
w(h)g˜0i(h) =
X
h∈H
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
w(h)g˜∗i (h) + w(h)g
0
i(h) + w(h) [g˜
0
i(h)− g˜∗i (h)] . (A.34)
Using g0i(h) = g
∗
i (h)− g0i(h) one finds
P
h∈Hw(h)g˜
0
i(h) ≤
P
h∈Hw(h)g˜
∗
i (h) if
w(h) ≥ w(hˆ). Moreover, h¯0i = (1/s)
P
˜h∈H hg
0
i(h) > h¯
∗
i implies f( h¯
0
i
¯
z∗) >
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗). Hence, f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)−
P
h∈Hw(h)g˜
∗
i (h) < f( h¯
0
i
¯
z∗)−
P
ˆ
h∈Hw(h)g˜
0
i(h).
As this violates (17) and, thus, equilibrium condition (b) of Definition 1, we
have w(h) < w(h), as claimed. Note however that hˆ /∈ Θ implies w(hˆ) =
ˆ
ˆ
W = 1. Hence, w(h) < w(h) cannot hold in equilibrium because type h
would then prefer to work as production worker rather than as manager.
Thus, h ≥ h for all h ∈ Θ and hˆ /∈ Θ, i.e., there exists a cut-oﬀ level hk ∈ H
such that h ≥ hk for all h ∈ Θ. Hence, Θ = {hk, ..., hK}, hk ≥ h1, which
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confirms part (ii).
In order to prove part (iii), note that w(hk) ≥ 1, with strict equality if
not all types hk are managers, according to condition (c) of Definition 1. As
some workers of type hk are employed as managers, w(h) > 1 for all h > hk
immediately follows from part (i).
Finally, to prove part (iv), note that w(h¯∗i ) ≥
£
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F
¤
/s, accord-
ing to (18). According to part (i), strict equality holds if h¯∗i ∈ Si. Thus,
if Si = {h¯∗i }, part (iv) is trivial. Now suppose Si 6= {h¯∗i } and note that
h¯∗i ∈ [hk, hK], according to part (ii). Also suppose that there is an equi-
librium, with assignment functions g˜0i ∈ G˜, average managerial skill levels
h¯0i = (1/s)
P
h∈H
˜hg0i(h), i ∈ I, and corresponding mapping z0 = (α0,q0), such
that w(h¯0i) >
£
f( h¯0i
¯
z0)− F
¤
/s for h¯0i /
˜
∈ Si. Then any firm j 6= i which
employs g˜0j(h¯
0
i) > 0 managers of type h¯
0
i would prefer to replace this type by
hiring εg0i(h) managers from each type h ∈ Si, with ε = g˜0j(h¯0i)/s. To see this,
note that wage costs for these types are given by
X
h∈Si
˜w(h)εg0i(h) =
g˜0j(h¯
0
i)
s
X
h∈Si
w(h)g˜0i(h) =
g˜0j(h¯
0
i)[f( h¯
0
i
¯
z0)− F ]
s
, (A.35)
where the latter equation is implied by equilibrium condition (15). Since
such a replacement saves wage costs w(h¯0i)g˜j(h¯
0
i), (A.35) implies that net
cost savings are given by
£
w(h¯0i)−
£
f( h¯0i
¯
z0)− F
¤
/s
¤
g˜0j(h¯
0
i), which is strictly
positive if w(h¯0i) >
£
f( h¯0i
¯
z0)− F
¤
/s for h¯0i /∈ Si, i.e., there would be a
profitable deviation. However, according to condition (b) of Definition 1,
this is inconsistent with an equilibrium. Hence, w(h¯∗i ) =
£
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F
¤
/s.
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider strict convexity of f( h¯i
¯
z∗) in h¯i for
all i first. Suppose Si 6= {h¯∗i } for some i, i.e., there exist h, ˆ
ˆ
˜
h ∈ Si such that
h > h. If firm i replaces some managers of type h by some of type hˆ (i.e.,
firm i chooses an assignment function g˜0i ∈ G instead of g˜∗i ∈ G˜) its average
managerial skill rises from h¯∗i to h¯
0
i > h¯
∗
i . (Note that such a replacement is
possible since h, hˆ ∈ Si implies g˜∗i (hˆ) <
P
h∈Si g˜
∗
i (h) = s and s ≤ g(h) for all
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h ∈ H by assumption; thus, g˜∗i (ˆ ˆh) < g(h).) Given z∗, we then obtainX
h∈Si
w(h)g˜0i(h) =
X
h∈Si
w(h)g˜∗i (h) + w(h)[g˜
0
i(h)− g˜∗i (h)] + w(ˆ ˆh)[g˜0i(h)− g˜∗i (hˆ)]
= f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
h− hˆ
s
[g˜0i(h)− g˜∗i (h)] , (A.36)
˜
for total wage costs for managerial workers in firm i, where
g0i(h)− g˜∗i (h) = −
h
˜ ˆg0i(h)− g˜∗i (hˆ)
i
, (A.37)
(15) and (A.32) have been used. Using h¯0i = (1/s)
P
˜h∈Si hg
0
i(h) and h¯
∗
i =
(1/s)
P
˜h∈Si hg
∗
i (h) together with (A.37) implies h¯
0
i−h¯∗i = [g˜0i(h)− g˜∗i (h)] (h−
hˆ)/s. Hence,
X
h∈Si
w(h)g˜0i(h) = f( h¯i
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
(h¯0i − h¯∗i ), (A.38)
Moreover, gross profits of firm i now read f( h¯0i
¯
z∗). According to condition
(b) of Definition 1, the considered deviation must not to be profitable for
firm i, i.e.,
f( h¯0i
¯
z∗) ≤ f( h¯i
¯
z∗) +
∂f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
(h¯0i − h¯i), (A.39)
which can be rewritten as
£
f( h¯0i
¯
z∗)− f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
¤
/
¡
h¯0i − h¯i
¢
≤ ∂f( h¯i
¯
z∗)/∂h¯i.
However, this is impossible if f( h¯i
¯
z∗) is strictly convex in h¯i. Thus, equi-
librium job assignment is hypersegregated under strict convexity of f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
in h¯i.
It remains to be shown that h¯∗i = h¯
∗ for all i in any equilibrium if f( h¯i
¯
z∗)
is strictly concave in h¯i. To see this, note that (18) implies
sw(h¯∗i ) = f( h¯
∗
i
¯
z∗)− F ≥ f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
(h¯∗i − h¯∗j) (A.40)
and
sw(h¯∗j) = f( h¯
∗
j
¯
z∗)− F ≥ f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
(h¯∗j − h¯∗i ), (A.41)
34
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 8
respectively. Without loss of generality, suppose h¯∗i > h¯
∗
j for some i, j ∈ I,
i 6= j. Inequalities (A.40) and (A.41) then imply
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
≥
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
h¯∗i − h¯∗j
≥
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
. (A.42)
However, ∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)/∂h¯i < ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j, if h¯∗i > h¯
∗
j and f( h¯i
¯
z∗) is strictly
concave in h¯i. Thus, h¯∗i 6= h¯∗j for i, j ∈ I, i 6= j can never hold in an
equilibrium. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof is structured in three steps. It
adapts to the present context (and heavily draws on) the proof of the first
part of Proposition 2 in Saint-Paul (2001).
Step 1: This step shows that either two firms i and j oﬀer the same wage
schedule w(h) for all h ∈ Si ∪ Sj and hire managers from the same subset of
H, or managers in both firms are completely segregated by managerial skill
(i.e., if h¯∗i > h¯
∗
j , then h
−
i ≥ h+j for any h−i ∈ Si and h+j ∈ Sj). Consider any
two firms i, j ∈ I with h¯∗i 6= h¯∗j . Take any two types h−i ∈ Si and h+j ∈ Sj
from both firms. Equation (10) implies
sw(h−i ) = f( h¯
∗
i
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
(h−i − h¯∗i ) ≥
f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
(h−i − h¯∗j) (A.43)
and
sw(h+j ) = f( h¯
∗
j
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
(h+j − h¯∗j) ≥
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)− F +
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
(h+i − h¯∗i ), (A.44)
respectively. Consequently,"
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
−
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
# ¡
h−i − h+j
¢
≥ 0. (A.45)
If ∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)/∂h¯i > ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j, then (A.45) implies h−i ≥ h+j for any
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h−i ∈ Si and h+j ∈ Sj. Thus, if h¯∗i > h¯∗j and ∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)/∂h¯i > ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j,
then there is complete segregation of firms i and j by managerial skill. In
contrast, if h−i < h
+
j for some types h
−
i ∈ Si and h+j ∈ Sj (i.e., firms i and j
hire managers from the same subset of H) and h¯∗i > h¯∗j , then
f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗) = f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)+δ(h¯∗i−h¯∗j) with δ =
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
=
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
, (A.46)
according to parts (i) and (iv) of Lemma 2, i.e., both firms oﬀer the same
wage schedule w(h) for any type h they employ.
The next two steps demonstrate that if firms i and j oﬀer the same wage
schedule, then any firm k with h¯∗k ∈ (h¯∗j , h¯∗i ) oﬀers this wage schedule as well,
and hires managers from the same subset of H as firms i and j. Having
established this fact then concludes the proof of Proposition 8.
Step 2: This step shows that for any firm k with h¯∗k ∈ (h¯∗j , h¯∗i ), f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗) =
f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗) + δ(h¯∗k − h¯∗j) holds, if firms i and j hire managers from the same
subset in H.
First, note that parts (i) and (iv) of Lemma 2 imply sw(h¯∗k) = f( h¯
∗
k
¯
z∗)−
F ≥ f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)−F + δ(h¯∗k− h¯∗j) (remember δ = ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j from (A.46)).
It thus remains to be shown that f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗) > f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗) + δ(h¯∗k − h¯∗j) cannot
hold in equilibrium. Note that an average managerial skill level of h¯∗k could be
reached by firm k by hiring types h¯∗i and h¯
∗
j in proportions (h¯
∗
k−h¯∗j)/(h¯∗i −h¯∗j)
and (h¯∗i − h¯∗k)/(h¯∗i − h¯∗j), respectively, implying total wage cost equal to
sw(h¯∗i )(h¯
∗
k − h¯∗j) + sw(h¯∗j)(h¯∗i − h¯∗k)
(h¯∗i − h¯∗j)
. (A.47)
Now, using sw(h¯∗i ) = f( h¯
∗
i
¯
z∗)−F and sw(h¯∗j) = f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)−F from part (iv)
of Lemma 2 and f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗) = f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)+δ(h¯∗i−h¯∗j) from (A.46), this total wage
cost becomes f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)− F + δ(h¯∗k − h¯∗j). However, f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗) > f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗) +
δ(h¯∗k− h¯∗j) means that firm k would make strictly positive profits. According
to condition (b) of Definition 2, this is inconsistent with an equilibrium.
Step 3: This step shows that for any firm k with h¯∗k ∈ (h¯∗j , h¯∗i ),
δ =
∂f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)
∂h¯k
=
∂f( h¯∗i
¯
z∗)
∂h¯i
=
∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)
∂h¯j
(A.48)
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holds if firms i and j hire managers from the same subset of H. Note that
for all h ∈ Sk , sw(h) = f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)− F + (h− h¯∗k)∂f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)/∂h¯k, according
to part (i) of Lemma 2. Now suppose δ < (>)∂f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)/∂h¯k; then, for all
h ∈ Sk with h < (>)h¯∗k we have
w(h) <
f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)− F + δ(h− h¯∗k)
s
. (A.49)
Substituting f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗) = f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗) + δ(h¯∗k − h¯∗j), which has been established
in step 2, and using δ = ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j, we thus find
sw(h) < f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)− F + ∂f( h¯∗j
¯
z∗)/∂h¯j(h− h¯∗j). (A.50)
However, this contradicts part (i) of Lemma 2. Thus, δ = ∂f( h¯∗k
¯
z∗)/∂h¯k.
This concludes the proof. ¥
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